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Abstract
In Bostock v Clayton County (2020) Gorsuch J holds that direct discrimination 
because of sexual orientation is a form of direct discrimination because of sex. I 
argue that the same is true under the Equality Act 2010. I consider the arguments of 
(Finnis, in: Finnis (ed) Intention and identity: collected essays, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2011) and (Gardner in Oxf J Leg Stud 18(1):167–187, 1998) that 
“because of”, “on grounds of”, and similar phrases in UK discrimination legislation 
invoke the state of mind of the discriminator. I apply this point to Bull and Bull v 
Hall and Preddy [2013] arguing that (i) the UK Supreme Court was wrong to find 
direct discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, while, (ii), nevertheless, 
under the Equality Act 2010, that case and similar cases actually involve direct dis-
crimination because of sex, not because of sexual orientation. I conclude by consid-
ering some objections, precedents, and implications.
Keywords Finnis · Direct discrimination · Grounds · Sex · Sexual orientation · Bull · 
Equality Act 2010
Introduction
On 15 June 2020 the Supreme Court of the United States handed down judgment in 
three combined cases, Bostock v Clayton County (2020), Altitude Express v Zarda 
(2020), and Harris Funeral Homes v Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(2020). In this judgment the court held that direct discrimination because of sexual 
orientation or gender presentation was a form of direct discrimination because of 
sex. Gorsuch J, writing for the majority, stated it succinctly:
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it is impossible to discriminate against a person for being homosexual or 
transgender without discriminating against that individual based on sex. (Bos-
tock v Clayton County (2020))
Does anything similar hold in the UK? Is it the case that under UK law direct dis-
crimination because of sexual orientation is a form of direct discrimination because 
of sex? In this essay I argue that it is the case.
The main piece of anti-discrimination legislation in force in the UK1 is the Equal-
ity Act 2010 (‘the Act’). This outlaws discrimination (sections 13–25), harassment 
(section  26), and victimisation (section  27). Discrimination comes in two forms, 
direct discrimination (sections 13–18) and indirect discrimination (sections 19). The 
focus of this article is on direct discrimination, which is defined in section 13(1) of 
the Act as follows:
A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected char-
acteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others.
The protected characteristics are listed in section 4 of the Act and explained briefly 
in sections 5–12 of the Act. Our focus is on the characteristics of sex (section 11) 
and sexual orientation (section 12).
It is to be noted that the law does not state that it is necessary either that B have 
the protected characteristic or that B be thought by A to have the protected charac-
teristic. Indeed, the Explanatory Notes to the Equality Act 2010 explicitly say:
Direct discrimination occurs where the reason for a person being treated less 
favourably than another is a protected characteristic […]. This definition is 
broad enough to cover cases where the less favourable treatment is because of 
the victim’s association with someone who has that characteristic (for exam-
ple, is disabled), or because the victim is wrongly thought to have it (for exam-
ple, a particular religious belief). (Explanatory Notes to the Equality Act 2010: 
[59])
It will be observed that the drafter of the notes evidently thinks that “the reason for” 
is synonymous with “because” (the word used in the Act).
The Act supersedes, among other pieces of legislation, the Equality Act 2006 and 
the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007 (the Regulations), made 
pursuant to the Equality Act 2006. A similar definition of “direct discrimination” to 
that in the Act was provided in section 3(1) of the Regulations:
For the purposes of these Regulations, a person (“A”) discriminates against 
another (“B”) if, on grounds of the sexual orientation of B or any other person 
1 The Act applies in whole to England and Wales, in whole apart from one section and one part to Scot-
land, and in only two sections and two sub-sections to Northern Ireland. See the Act, section 217.
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except A, A treats B less favourably than he treats or would treat others (in 
cases where there is no material difference in the relevant circumstances).
Another similar, though narrower still, definition was used in section  1(2) of the 
(now-superseded) Sex Discrimination Act 1975:2
a person discriminates against a woman if—
(a) on the ground of her sex, he treats her less favourably than he treats or would 
treat a man[.]
It should be observed that paragraph 61 of the Explanatory Notes to the Equality 
Act 2010 also comments that the difference in wording between “because of” and 
“on grounds of” in the various different Acts is not significant:
This section uses the words “because of” where the previous legislation con-
tains various definitions using the words “on grounds of”. This change in 
wording does not change the legal meaning of the definition, but rather is 
designed to make it more accessible to the ordinary user of the Act.
I noted above that the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 contained a narrower formu-
lation: “on the ground of her sex” for discrimination against women, and “on the 
ground of his sex” for discrimination against men. (Compare also the narrow for-
mulation of the statute at issue in Bostock v Clayton County (2020), Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act 1964: “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin”.) In the Equality Act 2010 this is widened to include A’s discrimi-
nating against B because of sex, even if it is not because of B’s sex, whether male or 
female. It should be noted that Article 2 of Directive 2006/54/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle 
of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employ-
ment and occupation (OJ 2006 L 204) employs the broader definition of “direct dis-
crimination” in section (a) of Article 2:
direct discrimination: where one person is treated less favourably on grounds 
of sex than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situa-
tion[.]3
These observations are important to answer an objection from Julian Rivers (2017, 
personal communication, 18 July). The objection is based on section  11 of the 
Equality Act 2010:
2 I quote the relevant subsection for the provision of goods and services, since that will loom the largest 
in what follows.
3 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for the journal for this reference.
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In relation to the protected characteristic of sex—
(a) a reference to a person who has a particular protected characteristic is a reference 
to a man or to a woman
The objection is that this section in fact shows that the law is still working with the 
narrower formulation. The objection could also be based on the Explanatory Notes 
to the Equality Act 2010:
This section is a new provision which explains that references in the Act to 
people having the protected characteristic of sex are to mean being a man or 
a woman, and that men share this characteristic with other men, and women 
with other women. (Explanatory Notes to the Equality Act 2010: [54])
It seems to me that the reason why the drafters included this definition for “sex”, 
and the effect of their including it, was to ensure that conditions such as intersex and 
other sexes were not counted as sexes under the Act. It should also be noted that 
similar definitions are provided for all the characteristics. Since the characteristic of 
race comes back into the discussion below, I quote this one from section 9 for com-
parative purposes:
In relation to the protected characteristic of race—
(a) a reference to a person who has a particular protected characteristic is a reference 
to a person of a particular racial group[.] (Equality Act 2010, s 9)
It is clear from paragraph 50 of the Explanatory Notes to the Equality Act 2010 that 
this definition of “race” is not to be taken as restricting the expansive phrase “on 
racial grounds” to be found in the Race Relations Act 1976. I return to this point 
below.
Grounds
The question arises what is meant by each of these four formulations, “on grounds 
of”, “on the ground of”, “because of”, and “the reason for”. In the first place, it 
seems on the face of it that they all relate to a mental state of the person alleged to 
have discriminated. As Lord Nicholls put it when considering the similar phrase “by 
reason that” found in section 2(1) of the Race Relations Act 1976:
Save in obvious cases, answering the crucial question will call for some con-
sideration of the mental processes of the alleged discriminator. Treatment, 
favourable or unfavourable, is a consequence which follows from a decision. 
(Nagarajan v London Regional Transport [1999]: 511A)
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Or, to quote Lord Steyn from the same case, direct discrimination means that the 
discriminator’s
knowledge caused or influenced the discriminator to treat the victimised 
person less favourably than he would treat other persons. In other words, 
it postulates that the discriminator’s knowledge of the protected act had a 
subjective impact on his mind. (Nagarajan v London Regional Transport 
[1999]: 519H–520A)
Lord Browne–Wilkinson dissented from the majority in the case, but he agreed with 
the majority’s view that it called for consideration of a mental element:
This is a wholly subjective question directed specifically to the mental state 
of the alleged discriminator: why did he treat the claimant less favourably? 
[…]
Thus the question is essentially a subjective one: why did the alleged discrimi-
nator act as he did? My Lords, it is this very clarity of the statutory words 
which require the court to determine the reason why the alleged discriminator 
treated the claimant less favourably that makes it difficult to understand why in 
some of the authorities and in your Lordships’ judgments the question is often 
posed, not subjectively, but objectively. […]
Parliament has, in introducing legislation to outlaw discrimination on grounds 
of sex or race, expressly required the court to investigate the reasons which 
have led the alleged discriminator to take the steps which he did. This is not 
surprising since this was pioneering legislation designed to produce a social, 
as much as a legal, change. The only yardstick (in the field of direct discrimi-
nation) must be the mental state of the alleged discriminator. […]
There is no escape from the difficulties inherent in examining the minds of 
the parties. (Nagarajan v London Regional Transport [1999]: 507E, 508D–E, 
509E, and 509F)
There has been less judicial attempt to delineate precisely what the mental element 
should be, but Finnis (2011: 269) has advanced an interpretation of “grounds” that I 
find compelling:
Acting “on the grounds of” X means that X enters into the acting person’s or 
body’s deliberation in such a way as to affect that person’s selection of means 
and/or ends.
Finnis (2011: 275) also discusses the phrase “because of”, which has now 
replaced “on grounds of” in the definition of direct discrimination:
the definition’s concern with why (“because of” what) A treated B less favour-
ably, rather than with what factors contributed to the impact of A’s conduct on 
B, indicates that a decision-making body’s treatment of B cannot rightly be 
judged direct discrimination unless at least one step in the body’s actual, moti-
vating reasoning towards decision refers to a protected characteristic.
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Finnis (2011: 274) links together the various different judicial descriptions of the 
mental state relevant to judgments of discrimination as follows:
Anything which (even very reluctantly) you count—and only what you count—
in favour of behaving the way you do appears (under the description it has in 
your actual practical reasoning) in the adequate account of your grounds = 
motives = intentions = ends = means (and thus of your action).
So, to act on something as a ground, the thing has to motivate one to act in that way, 
and all such mental motivations are grounds. The above considerations do not turn 
just on the meaning of the word “ground”. The word “on” is also relevant: if one 
acts on something, that means that one makes the thing one’s own, one’s motivating 
ground or reason.
John Gardner (1998: 182) goes further than Finnis in suggesting that only the 
“operative” premisses in one’s reasoning are motivating and so relevant for the pur-
poses of discrimination law:
“on the ground that” […] refers to the operative rather than the auxiliary prem-
isses of the discriminator’s reasoning […] since an auxiliary premiss has only 
an informational and not a motivational role in one’s thinking.
One problem with this is that in real-life cases of direct discrimination it is not a 
hard-and-fast matter how to divide up the reasoning into “auxiliary” and “operative” 
premisses. Gardner (2014, personal communication, 25 July) gives this example of 
the thinking of a hypothetical employer:
I
(1) Every one of my employees engaging in conduct forbidden by my religious 
authority should be sacked by me.
(2) Everyone in a homosexual relationship is engaging in conduct forbidden by 
my religious authority.
Therefore,
(3) Every one of my employees in a homosexual relationship should be sacked 
by me.
II
(3) Every one of my employees in a homosexual relationship should be sacked 
by me.
(4) B is in a homosexual relationship and is one of my employees.
(5) Therefore, B should be sacked by me.
Gardner’s analysis of this hypothetical example is that (1) and (3) are operative 
premisses, but (2) and (4) are auxiliary factual premisses. He concludes that dis-
crimination because of sexual orientation4 is made out in this case because sexual 
4 Gardner does not necessarily mean this in a technical legal sense. He is speaking more generally.
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orientation features in an operative premiss, (3). But how can Gardner rule out a 
real-life employer from reasoning to the same conclusion as follows instead?
I
(1) Everyone in a homosexual relationship is engaging in conduct forbidden 
by my religious authority.
(2) B is in a homosexual relationship and is one of my employees.
(3) Therefore, B is one of my employees and is engaging in conduct forbid-
den by my religious authority.
II
(3) B is one of my employees and is engaging in conduct forbidden by my 
religious authority.
(4) Every one of my employees engaging in conduct forbidden by my reli-
gious authority should be sacked by me.
(5) Therefore, B should be sacked by me.
The reasoning here does not seem to be relevantly different from the point of 
view of discrimination law, but the switch to having (1), (2), and (3), as auxiliary 
premisses, and having only (4) as an operative premiss, means that on Gardner’s 
analysis there is now no discrimination because of sexual orientation, since here 
sexual orientation does not feature in the only operative premiss, (4). It does not 
seem plausible for Gardner to say that there is a relevant difference here, so I 
conclude that it does not matter whether the protected characteristic occurs in an 
operative or an auxiliary premiss, as long as it features somewhere in the line of 
motivational reasoning. This also was the stance adopted by Advocate General 
Maduro in his opinion for the Court of Justice in Coleman v Attridge Law [2008]:
the Directive performs an exclusionary function: it excludes religious belief, 
age, disability and sexual orientation from the range of permissible reasons 
an employer may legitimately rely upon in order to treat one employee less 
favourably than another. In other words, after the coming into force of the 
Directive it is no longer permissible for these considerations to figure in the 
employer’s reasoning when she decides to treat an employee less favourably.
[19] […] The discriminator relies on a suspect classification in order to act 
in a certain way. The classification is not a mere contingency but serves as 
an essential premise of his reasoning. An employer’s reliance on those sus-
pect grounds is seen by the Community legal order as an evil which must be 
eradicated. Therefore, the Directive prohibits the use of those classifications 
as grounds upon which an employer’s reasoning may be based. In this way, 
[…] the prohibition of direct discrimination […] operates as an exclusion-
ary mechanism (by excluding from an employer’s reasoning reliance on cer-
tain grounds)[.] (Coleman v Attridge Law [2008]: 785–786 [18–19])
In any case, while initially it seems compelling that “because of”, “on grounds 
of” etc. refer, as detailed above, to mental states, there has, nevertheless, been 
running against this idea a very influential judicial current dating back to 
the case R v Birmingham City Council [1989], a case concerning whether the 
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Council’s provision of more places at selective schools for 11-year-old boys than 
for 11-year-old girls constituted discrimination on the ground of sex. Lord Goff, 
giving the only substantive judgment in the House of Lords, put forward a test 
that he took to answer the question whether the less favourable treatment was on 
the ground of sex. This test is now known as the “but for” test:
There is discrimination under the statute if there is less favourable treatment 
on the ground of sex, in other words if the relevant girl or girls would have 
received the same treatment as the boys but for their sex. The intention or 
motive of the defendant to discriminate […] is not a necessary condition of 
liability; it is perfectly possible to envisage cases where the defendant had no 
such motive, and yet did in fact discriminate on the ground of sex. […] [I]f the 
council’s submission were correct it would be a good defence for an employer 
to show that he discriminated against women not because he intended to do so 
but (for example) because of customer preference, or to save money, or even to 
avoid controversy. (R v Birmingham City Council [1989]: 1194B–C) 5
The view that Lord Goff here rejects is not the view advanced by Finnis and con-
tended for here. The view that Lord Goff is rejecting seems to be that for there to be 
discrimination it is necessary that the discriminator be motivated by, or intend to 
bring about, the prospect of discrimination itself. This does not follow from Finnis’s 
definition: it is true that, for discrimination to be made out, the ground of the action 
must be discriminatory, but it is not true that the ground must be discrimination. 
Further, actions can, and typically do, have more than one ground (cf. Owen and 
Briggs v James [1982] ICR 618: 623E (Sir David Cairns), 626A (Stephenson LJ)), 
and there may indeed be more than one action at issue too: the motive that leads 
the discriminator to adopt a discriminatory criterion or policy is only one ground; 
another ground—the discriminatory one in R v Birmingham City Council [1989]—
would be the motivating factor that leads the discriminator to apply the criterion or 
policy in a particular instance of less favourable treatment. In R v Birmingham City 
Council [1989] the grounds that motivated, for any given 11-year-old girl, the Coun-
cil to offer her less chance of a place at a selective secondary school than it offered 
a comparable 11-year-old boy, were simply that she was a girl and that the policy 
was to have fewer places open to girls. These grounds are not ruled out by what Lord 
Goff had to say, and, indeed, the second was found to be the ground of discrimina-
tion in the case. (The House of Lords did not consider any specific individual case of 
less favourable treatment, so they did not specifically mention any grounds relating 
exclusively to individuals.) On the other hand, the grounds that motivated the Coun-
cil to adopt the discriminatory policy that it did were much more complicated: Lord 
Goff comments that “the history of proposals for secondary school reorganisation in 
Birmingham has been a history of changing policies according to the philosophy of 
the political party in power” (R v Birmingham City Council [1989]: 1190G).
5 The test was put forward in oral argument by Lord Lester QC and David Pannick for the Equality 
Commission (R v Birmingham City Council [1989]: 1184E).
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Lord Goff’s “but for” test itself is, however, incompatible with Finnis’s explana-
tion of “ground” and with, I contend, the statute itself. This is because the “but for” 
test also picks out factors that are not premisses that motivate one’s action, and that, 
thus, are not grounds on which one acts in the sense of the statute. As Finnis puts it:
the question […] whether the complainant “would… have received the same 
treatment from the defendant but for his or her sex” […] eliminates the statu-
torily mandated inquiry into the defendant’s grounds, practical reasoning and 
deliberation, and intentionality, in favour of an inquiry (without statutory man-
date) into the causation of the complainant’s outcome. (Finnis 2011: 271–272)
Lord Nicholls also recognises the incompatibility of the “but for” test and the 
statutorily mandated inquiry into grounds in a 2001 case in connection with the sim-
ilar phrase “by reason that”:
Contrary to views sometimes stated, the third ingredient (“by reason that”) 
does not raise a question of causation as that expression is usually understood. 
[…] Sometimes the court may look for the “operative” cause, or the “effec-
tive” cause. Sometimes it may apply a “but for” approach. For the reasons I 
sought to explain in Nagarajan v London Regional Transport [2000] 1 AC 
502, 510–512, a causation exercise of this type is not required either by sec-
tion i(i)(a) or section 2. The phrases “on racial grounds” and “by reason that” 
denote a different exercise: why did the alleged discriminator act as he did? 
What, consciously or unconsciously, was his reason? Unlike causation, this is 
a subjective test. (Chief Constable of the West Yorkshire Police v Khan [2001]: 
1954 B–D [29])
James v Eastleigh Borough Council (HL) [1990]
The leading case on the concept of direct discrimination in UK discrimination law, 
the case of James v Eastleigh Borough Council (HL) [1990], features the “but for” 
test at work. The case concerned whether it was discrimination against Peter James 
on the ground of his sex6 to charge him for entry to the swimming baths on the 
ground that he was not of pensionable age, the criterion for free entry to Fleming 
Park Leisure Centre, Eastleigh (James v Eastleigh Borough Council (HL) [1990]: 
765D). When the case was in the Court of Appeal the argument that discrimina-
tion was on the ground of his sex if the sex of the victim was “a substantial cause 
of the less favourable treatment” (James v Eastleigh Borough Council (CA) [1990]: 
74A) was put to the court, and put as being equivalent to the “but for” test (James 
v Eastleigh Borough Council (CA) [1990]: 74B). The Vice-Chancellor, Sir Nicolas 
Browne-Wilkinson, criticized this argument:
6 At this stage the narrower formulation as still used by the law (the Sex Discrimination Act 1975).
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What is relevant is the defendant’s reason for doing an act, not the causa-
tive effect of the act done by the defendant. […] [O]ne is looking, not to 
the causative link between the defendant’s behaviour and the detriment to 
the plaintiff, but to the reason why the defendant treated the plaintiff less 
favourably. The relevant question is “did the defendant act on the ground 
of sex?” not “did the less favourable treatment result from the defendant’s 
actions?” (James v Eastleigh Borough Council (CA) [1990]: 74C, 74D)
This reasoning seems to me sound, and quite compatible with Finnis’s inter-
pretation endorsed above. Further, the Vice-Chancellor gave an argument for this 
way of understanding the statute:
If there is direct discrimination in every case where there is a substantial 
causative link between the defendant’s treatment and the detriment suffered 
by the plaintiff as a result of his sex I can see no room for the operation of 
subsection (1)(b) [i.e. for indirect discrimination]. In every case in which a 
sexually neutral condition in fact operates differentially and detrimentally to 
one sex as opposed to the other, the imposition of such a condition would be 
a substantial cause of detriment to the plaintiff by reason of his or her sex, 
i.e. it would […] therefore constitute direct discrimination […].
This plainly was not the intention of Parliament which was drawing a clear 
distinction between, on the one hand, those cases where the defendant 
expressly or covertly acts by reference to the sex of the plaintiff and, on 
the other, those cases where the defendant acted on grounds not expressly 
or covertly related to sex but his actions have caused a disparate impact as 
between the sexes. (James v Eastleigh Borough Council (CA) [1990]: 75D–
F)
This argument seems very plausible to me: the “but for” test would level the dis-
tinction between direct and indirect discrimination. The only way in which the sig-
nificance of the distinction may plausibly be understood is if direct discrimination 
is decided by reference to the subjective factors of the alleged discriminator’s moti-
vation, and indirect discrimination is decided by reference to objective, causative 
factors. The argument did not, however, compel Lord Bridge, who, in giving the 
leading judgment when James came to the House of Lords, adopted Lord Goff’s 
“but for” test:
Lord Goff’s test, it will be observed, is not subjective, but objective. Adopting 
it here the question becomes: “Would the plaintiff, a man of 61, have received 
the same treatment as his wife but for his sex?” An affirmative answer is ines-
capable. (James v Eastleigh Borough Council (HL) [1990]: 765D)
In rejecting the appropriateness of the “but for” test I am not saying that James 
was not a case of direct discrimination. If Mr James’s sex (as opposed to the mere 
fact of his not being of pensionable age) really was a factor in the reasoning that led 
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to his being turned away then he was directly discriminated against—but this is a 
matter on which evidence should have been taken.7
It might be thought that, whether or not correct, the precedent here is decisive, 
but, in addition to the words of Lord Nicholls in Chief Constable of the West York-
shire Police v Khan [2001], there are the words of Lord Phillips from his judgment 
in a case from 2009:
This “but for” test was another way of identifying the factual criterion that was 
applied by the council as the basis for their discrimination, but it is not one 
that I find helpful. It is better simply to ask what were the facts that the dis-
criminator considered to be determinative when making the relevant decision. 
(R (E) v Governing Body of JFS [2009]: 747D–E [16])
This indicates that courts are not bound to implement the “but for” test. To sum 
up, I contend that (i) the “but for” test does not conform to either the current stat-
ute or its predecessors relating to discrimination, (ii) the test should no longer be 
applied, and (iii) the courts should focus on attempting to determine whether the 
relevant protected characteristic featured as a ground of the less favourable treatment 
in question, i.e. whether the relevant protected characteristic motivated the actual 
imposition of the less favourable treatment.
The Ground of Sexual Orientation Versus The Ground Of Sex
I shall now apply the foregoing considerations to cases of alleged direct discrimina-
tion because of, or on grounds of, sexual orientation, focussing on the case of Bull 
and Bull v Hall and Preddy [2013]. The reason for this is that I shall be arguing that 
the judgment in this case was incorrect: it was not a case of direct discrimination on 
grounds of sexual orientation. I shall, however, be maintaining that the ingredients 
are made out, under the later Equality Act 2010, for direct discrimination because of 
sex. These results will generalize to similar cases.
The facts in Bull and Bull v Hall and Preddy [2013] are that Steven Preddy and 
Martyn Hall, who were gay men in a civil partnership with each other, were turned 
away on 5 September 2008 from the double room that they had booked in the Chy-
morvah Hotel, which was owned and run by Peter and Hazelmary Bull with assis-
tance from Bernard Quinn. The criterion given by the Bulls for their renting out of 
double rooms was “we prefer to let double accommodation to heterosexual married 
couples only” (Hall and Preddy v Bull and Bull [2011]: [11]). It is important to 
note that “heterosexual” means here “of the opposite sex”, not “of a heterosexual 
orientation” (Bernard Quinn 2014, personal communication, 24 July). Hall and 
Preddy alleged direct discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, which was 
7 In the judgment of the Court of Appeal it is recorded that in the court of first instance (Southampton 
County Court on 28 October 1987 before Judge Tucker) “it was common ground that the council’s policy 
was discriminatory within the meaning of section 1 of the Act”, so this point did not require any evi-
dence to be adduced or accepted.
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the finding of the Bristol County Court (Hall and Preddy v Bull and Bull [2011]: 
[11]), the Court of Appeal (Bull and Bull v Hall and Preddy [2012]), and the UK 
Supreme Court (Bull and Bull v Hall and Preddy [2013]).
The leading judgment from the Supreme Court was by Baroness Hale. She argues 
that the Bulls directly discriminated on grounds of sexual orientation. The Bulls 
contended that they discriminated on grounds of marital status (Bull and Bull v Hall 
and Preddy [2013]: 3747G [17]). (Although the case was heard under the Sexual 
Orientation Regulations 2007, it is worth noting that the characteristic of marriage 
or civil partnership was not then covered by discrimination legislation respecting 
services and public functions, and even now is not covered by the relevant part, Part 
3, of the Equality Act 2010. Same-sex marriage was not introduced in England and 
Wales until the Marriage (Same-sex Couples) Act 2013.) The crucial paragraph of 
Lady Hale’s judgment is, in my opinion, [29]:
I would […] regard the criterion of marriage or civil partnership as indissocia-
ble from the sexual orientation of those who qualify to enter it. More impor-
tantly, there is an exact correspondence between the advantage conferred and 
the disadvantage imposed in allowing a double bed to the one and denying it to 
the other. (Bull and Bull v Hall and Preddy [2013]: 3750F [29])
Contrary to Lady Hale, the criterion is clearly not indissociable from sexual ori-
entation, since (a) those of a heterosexual orientation do not have to marry, and, as 
she herself points out, (b) those of a homosexual orientation have always been free 
to get married (Bull and Bull v Hall and Preddy [2013]: 3748F [20]). Lady Hale 
responds to this point “They are not free to marry a person who shares their own ori-
entation” (Bull and Bull v Hall and Preddy [2013]: 3748F [20]). But this is, again, 
false, as her own example shows: Vita Sackville-West was of a homosexual orienta-
tion, and she married another person of a homosexual orientation, Harold Nicholson 
(Bull and Bull v Hall and Preddy [2013]: 3748F [20]).8 What is true is that one was 
not at the time legally free to marry someone of the same sex: this is only indirectly 
discriminatory under the Sexual-Orientation Regulations 2007, though I shall argue 
that it would have constituted direct discrimination because of sex under the Equal-
ity Act 2010.
Lady Hale secondly asserts that there is an “exact correspondence between the 
advantage conferred and the disadvantage imposed in allowing a double bed to 
8 NB that s 12(1) of the Equality Act 2010 states “Sexual orientation means a person’s sexual orientation 
towards—
(a) persons of the same sex,
(b) persons of the opposite sex, or
(c) persons of either sex.”
 So, “being sexually oriented towards men” and “being sexually oriented towards women” are not exam-
ples of sexual orientation within the meaning of the Act. The Explanatory Notes make this clear at para-
graph 57:
• A man and a woman who are both attracted only to people of the opposite sex from them share a 
sexual orientation.
• A man who is attracted only to other men is a gay man. A woman who is attracted only to other 
women is a lesbian. So a gay man and a lesbian share a sexual orientation.
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the one and denying it to the other” (Bull and Bull v Hall and Preddy [2013]: 
3748A [18]). This sentence should not be read literally, as it would then be obvi-
ously false: the category of those suffering a disadvantage did not coincide exactly 
with those with the protected characteristic, since (i) unmarried opposite-sex cou-
ples of heterosexual orientation were also barred from double rooms and, unnoted 
by Lady Hale (but noted by HHJ Rutherford in his judgment at the County Court 
(Hall and Preddy v Bull and Bull [2011]: [33])), (ii) two people of the same sex 
and of heterosexual orientation were also barred from sharing a double room, 
and (iii) a man of homosexual orientation and a woman of homosexual orienta-
tion, if married to each other, would be welcomed by the Bulls to share a double 
room (Bernard Quinn 2014, personal communication, 24 July). Rather, this sen-
tence of Lady Hale’s is to be understood as restricted to the comparison between 
an opposite-sex married couple and a couple in a civil partnership (by definition 
then a same-sex couple); this is how Lord Neuberger takes the sentence too (Bull 
and Bull v Hall and Preddy [2013]: 3761G [82]). If one restricts oneself to this 
comparison then there is indeed an exact correspondence: the opposite-sex mar-
ried couple will be given the double room, and the couple in a civil partnership 
will be denied it. This is admitted by the Bulls. But how are we supposed to get 
from here to a finding of direct discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation?
Lady Hale first cites a precedent from the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities (now the European Union) (Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der 
Deutschen Bühnen [2008]). In this case the Grand Chamber of the Court of Jus-
tice had considered whether, to quote Lady Hale’s summary, treating “a surviving 
life partner less favourably than a surviving spouse, by denying him a survivor’s 
pension, was direct discrimination within the meaning of the equal treatment 
directive” (Bull and Bull v Hall and Preddy [2013]: 3750C [28]). The court said:
According to Art.2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/78, direct discrimination occurs 
where one person is treated less favourably than another person who is in 
a comparable situation, on any of the grounds referred to in Art.1 of the 
Directive. (Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der Deutschen Bühnen [2008]: 
954 [66])
This is standard, but the court concludes:
If the referring court decides that surviving spouses and surviving life part-
ners are in a comparable situation so far as concerns that survivor’s ben-
efit, legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings must, as a con-
sequence, be considered to constitute direct discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation, within the meaning of Arts 1 and 2(2)(a) of Directive 
2000/78. (Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der Deutschen Bühnen [2008]: 955 
[72])
It is apparent that there is no mention of the discriminator’s grounds in this 
paragraph. In consequence, this part of the court’s judgment must be considered 
mistaken: a necessary ingredient of direct discrimination is that one discrimi-
nate on the ground of, or because of, a protected characteristic, and this has not 
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been established in this case. (I am not saying that the court simply forgot about 
grounds; I think that the court conceived, wrongly, that if one treated someone 
less favourably than a relevant comparator without the protected characteristic it 
must be on grounds of that characteristic. This is how Lord Neuberger under-
stands it (Bull and Bull v Hall and Preddy [2013]: 3761E [81]).) Maruko v Ver-
sorgungsanstalt der Deutschen Bühnen [2008] does not, however, establish a 
binding precedent on domestic law, as is noted by Lord Neuberger (Bull and Bull 
v Hall and Preddy [2013]: 3761G [81]).
Now, Lady Hale does add an additional reason towards the end of her consid-
eration of direct discrimination:
When it came to denying a double bed to Mr Preddy and Mr Hall, which 
they would have given to a heterosexual married couple, Mr and Mrs Bull 
were not only applying the criterion that they were unmarried. They were 
applying a criterion that their legal relationship was not that of one man and 
one woman, in other words a criterion indistinguishable from sexual orien-
tation. (Bull and Bull v Hall and Preddy [2013]: 3750H [30])
It should be clear by now that the criterion certainly was distinguishable from 
sexual orientation: as was discussed above, the Bulls would have barred two 
backpackers of the same sex and of heterosexual orientation from sharing a dou-
ble room (Hall and Preddy v Bull and Bull [2011]: [33]), and they would have 
allowed Vita Sackville-West and Harold Nicholson to share a double room. Nev-
ertheless, Lady Hale is correct: the Bulls’ criterion was not merely “only married 
couples can have a double room”, it was “only heterosexual [i.e. opposite-sex] 
married couples can have a double room”. Despite this, I still think that this is not 
a case of direct discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation: there is no men-
tion of that in the criterion at all, nor, as we have seen, is it hidden in the word 
“married”. (One can imagine that a legislature might have allowed only those of 
heterosexual orientation to marry, by asking the parties what their sexual orienta-
tion was before pronouncing them married, yet, as far as I know, no legislature 
has done anything like this.)
Although the “but for” test does not explicitly feature in the judgment of Lady 
Hale, it does feature in the concurring judgment of Lord Toulson JSC:
[In] this case the question [from James v Eastleigh Borough Council 
[1990]] becomes: would the claimants have received the same treatment as 
married heterosexuals but for their sexual orientation? (Bull and Bull v Hall 
and Preddy [2013]: 3759G [71])
Lord Toulson takes the answer to this question to be “yes”. But this is wrong: 
two men not of homosexual orientation like the backpackers discussed above 
would still have been denied a double room. It seems to me that a better way 
for Lord Toulson to have applied the “but for” test would have been: “would the 
claimants have received the same treatment as an opposite-sex couple but for 
their being of the same sex?”. It seems to me that the answer to this question is 
clearly “yes”, since the relevant comparator to a couple in a civil partnership is 
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established in section  3(4) of the Sexual Orientation Regulations 2007 to be a 
married couple. But all this presupposes that the “but for” test is a good test, and 
I have already argued at length that it is not to be relied upon.
So, if the “but for” test is not to be relied upon, how is one to decide cases like 
this? While it seems clear from the foregoing that sexual orientation was not a 
ground of the Bulls’ less favourable treatment of Hall and Preddy, the curious thing 
is that it looks as though the very words of the Bulls’ actual criterion show that the 
Bulls, in applying it, directly discriminated against Hall and Preddy because of, or 
on grounds of, sex, not on grounds of sexual orientation.9 The criterion does not 
say just “married couples only” but “heterosexual married couples only”; the addi-
tion of the word “heterosexual” to “married couples” to produce the actual criterion 
the Bulls used seems to me significant. As stated above, the Bulls did not use “het-
erosexual married couples” to mean “people of heterosexual orientation married to 
each other”.10 They used it to mean simply “different-sex married couples”. Now the 
discrimination is plain to see: it is direct discrimination because of sex, to use the 
phrase of the Equality Act 2010. The Bulls are saying that they will refuse double 
rooms to any couples of the same sex (as well as some, unmarried, couples of differ-
ent sexes). In other words, while they will let Preddy have a double room to himself, 
they will not allow another man, whatever his relationship to Preddy, to stay in the 
room with him, and that because of his being the same sex as Preddy. And that is 
direct discrimination because of sex, just as refusing to allow someone else of the 
same race to stay in the room with him for that reason would be direct discrimina-
tion because of race. Or, to give an example of more historical plausibility, just as 
refusing to allow someone else of a different race to stay in the room with him for 
that reason would be direct discrimination because of race. It would be no answer to 
say that this criterion hit all races equally hard, that whites were equally prevented 
from sharing with blacks as the corollary of blacks’ being prevented from sharing 
with whites.11 And it follows by parity of reasoning that it is no answer to a charge 
of discrimination because of sex to say that, since men are prevented from sharing 
with other men and women are prevented from sharing with other women, the crite-
rion that only different-sex couples may share a double room hits both sexes equally 
hard.
9 Although I am, as far as I know, the first person to apply this argument directly to Bull and Bull v Hall 
and Preddy [2013], the argument has been deployed more generally by many others, e.g. Pannick (1983), 
reprinted as Chapter 8 in Pannick (1985), Koppelman (1996), Koppelman (1994, 2001, 2002), and Win-
temute (1997a, b, 2003).
10 Trispiotis (2014: 43) states that “the sexual orientation of the couple figured not in the auxiliary prem-
ise (as the appellants claim it to be when they insist that they only wanted to accommodate married cou-
ples) but in the operative”. But in fact the sexual orientation figures in no premiss of the Bulls’ reasoning.
11 It was, however, enshrined in some US court judgments, eg Pace v Alabama (1883: 585). Harlan J 
also mentions the argument as having been advanced by counsel in his dissenting judgment Plessy v Fer-
guson (1896: 557). The argument was also advanced by the State of Virginia; cf. the judgment of Warren 
CJ, Loving v Virginia (1967: 8). The “hits both sexes equally hard” version also features in the judgment 




The reader may wonder whether there be any precedent in the UK for finding direct 
discrimination because of sex along these lines. In Grieg v Community Industry 
[1979] Ann Grieg was refused team employment with Community Industry on 
the grounds that “there would only have been one girl member of the team [which 
would have] created an imbalance in the composition of the team which was wholly 
unacceptable” (Grieg v Community Industry [1979]: 358E). Counsel for Community 
Industry argued that there was no direct discrimination on grounds of sex because 
Community Industry would have turned down one man applying for a vacancy in 
an otherwise all-female team (Grieg v Community Industry [1979]: 360F–H). This 
argument was rejected by the Employment Appeal Tribunal (Grieg v Community 
Industry [1979]: 361A–D), which found that Community Industry had directly dis-
criminated against Grieg, stating that “the applicant was refused because she was 
a girl and had a man applied he would, had he been otherwise suitable, have been 
taken into the team” (Grieg v Community Industry [1979]: 361G). What is particu-
larly interesting about this is that the Employment Appeal Tribunal did not reject 
Grieg’s argument on the basis that the discrimination was on the ground of “sexual 
imbalance” rather than of “sex”.
The parallel with Bull is instructive: the Bulls think that there being two people 
of the same sex creates “an imbalance” in the composition of the occupancy of a 
double room that is wholly unacceptable, and, had a woman applied for the position 
of room-sharer with Preddy, she would, unlike Hall, have been allowed in, had she 
been “otherwise suitable” (i.e. married to Preddy).
A somewhat similar case is Bain v Bowles [1991]. Here Bowles refused to allow 
Bain, a man, to place an advert in The Lady for a “working housekeeper cook” (Bain 
v Bowles [1991]: 357 [3]). Bowles attempted to justify the refusal by reference to 
this policy:
We only include advertisements for female employees outside the United 
Kingdom when the employer is a woman and resident in the household con-
cerned. (Bain v Bowles [1991]: 357 [3]).
Here Bowles might argue that The Lady did not discriminate against Bain because of 
sex, but only because of oppositeness of sex of employer and employee, i.e. because 
of the fact that Bain’s sex happened to be opposite to that of the employee sought.12 
The Court of Appeal, however, found direct discrimination on the ground of Bain’s 
sex.
It is racial cases in which the defectiveness of the putative defence that the Bulls 
discriminated not because of sex, but because of sameness of sex, is most obvious. 
The US case Loving v Virginia is a clear example of this: the US Supreme Court 
held that Virginia’s ban on mixed-race marriages rested “solely upon distinctions 
drawn according to race” and on “racial classifications” (1967: 11). By parity of 
12 In fact, Bain did not say in his advert that the cook would have to be female.
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reasoning, a ban on same-sex couples or mixed-sex couples must rest on “distinc-
tions drawn according to sex”. Although there does not seem to have been a pre-
cisely similar English case, Lord Simon did remark obiter in the House of Lords that 
“discriminating against a white woman on the ground that she had married a col-
oured man” would fall within the purview of the Race Relations Act 1968 (Applin 
v Race Relations Board [1974]: 290A), and Lord Denning said obiter in the Court 
of Appeal in the same case that a hypothetical case of a publican’s barring white 
women that came in with black men would be direct discrimination “on the ground 
of colour” (Race Relations Board v Applin [1973]: 828C). The parallel is clear: if 
a ban on mixed-race or same-race couples is direct discrimination because of race, 
then a ban on mixed-sex or same-sex couples is direct discrimination because of sex.
These precedents reinforce my conclusion that, while the UK Supreme Court 
erred in finding Bull a case of direct discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, 
had the case been heard under the Equality Act 2010, the correct decision would 
have been that the Bulls had directly discriminated because of sex.
Objections
It might be objected that this line of argument, while it may have been established 
for the United States by Bostock v Clayton County (2020), has already been deci-
sively rejected in the UK courts, most famously by the House of Lords in Advocate 
General v MacDonald [2003]. (Lord Prosser’s dissenting judgment at the earlier 
stage in the Inner House had embraced the argument I have put forward: Advocate 
General v MacDonald [2001]: 9–15 [21]–[40].) I quote from the leading judgment 
in the House of Lords, given by Lord Nicholls:
10 I should also mention an argument based on the Race Relations Act 1976 
(cap 74). The appellants sought to rely on the analogy of the restaurateur who 
refuses to serve mixed race couples. He will not admit a black man accompa-
nied by a white woman, or a white man accompanied by a black woman. This, 
it was said, would be racial discrimination. It would be racial discrimination 
even though the restaurateur’s policy applied equally to men of all races.
11 I agree. That would be racial discrimination. But the analogy sought to be 
drawn with the present cases is unsound. A restaurateur who refuses to serve 
a black man because he is accompanied by a white woman would thereby 
be discriminating on “racial grounds”. That phrase is amply wide enough to 
include such a case. This treatment would not cease to be discrimination on 
racial grounds because the restaurateur would equally discriminate on racial 
grounds in the converse situation of a white man and a black woman.
12 This is to be contrasted with the present cases. An employer who dismisses 
a male employee because of his sexual orientation is not discriminating against 




The first thing to note here is that since the Equality Act 2010 broadened the grounds 
of direct discrimination in this respect from “on the ground of her [or his] sex”, as 
found in sections  1(1)(a) and 1(2)(a) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, to the 
Equality Act 2010’s phrase “because of sex”, Lord Nicholls’s contrast drawn above 
falls away.
At this point a supporter of the line taken by Lord Nicholls in 2003 might recur 
to an objection I mentioned near the start based on the Explanatory Notes to the 
Equality Act 2010, which state, in commenting on the Act’s definition of “because 
of sex”:
This section is a new provision which explains that references in the Act to 
people having the protected characteristic of sex are to mean being a man or 
a woman, and that men share this characteristic with other men, and women 
with other women.
The objection goes that neither Hall nor Preddy was discriminated against 
because he was a man (or, obviously, because he was mistakenly thought to be a 
woman), so there is no direct discrimination because of sex (compare the dissenting 
opinion of Circuit Judge Sykes in Hively v Ivy Tech Community College (2017): 52, 
and the dissenting opinion of Alito J in Bostock v Clayton County (2020)). A related 
objection from Julian Rivers (2017, personal communication, 18 July) is that the 
Bulls discriminated not because of sex, but because of sameness of sex (two women 
in a civil partnership would also have been refused a double room). Rivers adds that 
while Hall and Preddy each have a sex, the couple does not have a sex, so one cannot 
say that it is the couple that is discriminated against. Finally, it is objected that if the 
meaning of “because of sex” were as broad as I am suggesting then there would be 
no need for the drafter to have included section 14 of the Equality Act 2010 to deal 
with “combined”, also known as “intersectional”, discrimination:
A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a combination of 
two relevant protected characteristics, A treats B less favourably than A treats 
or would treat a person who does not share either of those characteristics.13
It should first be noted that, on the face of it, these objections, if they were success-
ful, would tell against forbidding a mixed-race couple a double room. Suppose that 
A is a black man and B a white woman, and that C refuses them a double room on 
the grounds that A and B are not of the same race. C could, by the objection before 
us at the moment, argue that A is not being discriminated against because of his race 
(as he would have been admitted had B been black too), and that B is not being dis-
criminated against because of her race (as she would have been admitted had A been 
white too). Further, C could insist that there was no discrimination because of race, 
but just because of sameness of race, and that, in any case, neither A nor B, but only 
13 It should be noted that, as of the time of writing, section 14 of the Equality Act 2010 has still not been 
brought into force, and that there is a considerable current of academic writing that holds that it is redun-
dant (e. g. Hand 2011).
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the couple of A and B, has been discriminated against. It should be remembered that 
the Equality Act 2010 treats sex, race, and the other protected characteristics alike in 
this respect (direct discrimination).
It seems to me, in any case, that there is a strong argument against the contention 
that neither Hall nor Preddy was discriminated against because he was a man: when 
Preddy booked a double room by telephone on 4 September 2008 the Bulls thought 
that he was booking it for himself and a woman, whom they assumed to be his wife 
(Hall and Preddy v Bull and Bull [2011]: [11]–[12]). Now imagine Preddy’s com-
ing into the hotel the next day (Hall and Preddy v Bull and Bull [2011]: [13]): he 
is initially welcomed in, but when the Bulls see the sex of the person entering the 
hotel with him, everything changes. It is clear that the Bulls will let Preddy stay 
on his own in the double room, but will not let Hall in with him, because he is a 
man. Had Hall been a woman, and married to Preddy, they would have let him in, 
as they would have done had Preddy been a woman married to Hall. Hence it is 
clear that Hall is refused entry because he is not a woman married to Preddy. And 
this is discrimination because of sex (as well as marital status), just as refusing him 
entrance because he was not a white married to Preddy would have been discrimina-
tion because of race (as well as marital status). And there is discrimination against 
Preddy too: in being denied Hall’s company in the double room he is treated less 
favourably because he is a man than he would have been had he been a woman mar-
ried to Hall.
It may still be objected that refusing Hall because he does not meet the compound 
condition woman-not-married-to-Preddy is not the same as refusing Hall because 
he meets the simple condition being a man. (Compare Alito J: “Title VII prohibits 
discrimination because of sex itself, not everything that is related to, based on, or 
defined with reference to, ‘sex’”: Bostock v Clayton County (2020): dissent, fn 5.) 
But the legal equivalence between marriage and a civil partnership means that the 
only part of the compound condition that Hall fails to meet is being a woman (see 
section 3(4) of The Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007), and the 
Bulls not only knew this, but based their rejection of Hall on their knowledge that he 
was a man (they did not, of course, inquire whether he was married to Preddy). So, 
while out of the set of potential room-sharers for Preddy the Bulls rejected all men, 
even ones that might be just sharing a bed to save money rather than out of any rela-
tionship (Hall and Preddy v Bull and Bull [2011]: [33]), out of the set of potential 
room-sharers either married to or in a civil partnership with Preddy, the Bulls would 
have rejected all and only men.14 It might be further objected that the fact that the 
Bulls would have rejected all and only the men from this set does not show that they 
rejected them because they were men. But this is the description of what happened 
at the Bulls’ hotel on that day:
[Hall and Preddy] drove from Bristol to Cornwall and presented themselves at 
the hotel to be met by Mr Quinn who informed them of the hotel’s policy with 
14 Recall that at this point the law of England and Wales provided only for opposite-sex marriages, and 
only for same-sex civil partnerships.
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regard to double rooms. [Hall and Preddy] explained that they were in a civil 
partnership but were told by Mr Quinn that only mixed sex married couples 
could have double rooms.
(Hall and Preddy v Bull and Bull [2011]: 13)
Why did Quinn inform them of this policy? The answer is obvious: he could see 
that they were both men. He seems already to have known that Preddy was a man 
from the telephone booking (Hall and Preddy v Bull and Bull [2011]: 12), but he did 
not know that the person wanting to share the double room with Preddy was also a 
man. Quinn’s reasoning, on behalf of the Bulls, evidently went like this:
(1) Preddy is a man.
(2) Hall is a man.
(3) Two men do not make an opposite-sex married couple.
(4) Therefore, Hall and Preddy do not make an opposite-sex married couple.
(5) Those that do not make an opposite-sex married couple should not be allowed 
to share a double room.
(6) Therefore, Hall and Preddy should not be allowed to share a double room.
It is clear that Hall’s sex, and Preddy’s sex, played an essential role in this chain 
of reasoning. Had Quinn not realized that Hall was a man, or that Preddy was a 
man, he would not have come to the conclusion that he did. Therefore, the decision 
to refuse the double-room was taken in part because Hall was a man, and in part 
because Preddy was a man, as well as in part because of the belief that it was wrong 
to allow a same-sex couple to share a double room. Therefore, the decision was in 
part because of sex, contrary to the provisions of the Equality Act 2010.15
The fact that the decision was only in part because of sex does not show that it 
was not direct discrimination because of sex. If the criterion had been “no black 
couples and no unmarried couples” it would have been clearly direct discrimina-
tion because of race; if it had been “no couples over 60 and no unmarried couples” 
it would have been clearly direct discrimination because of age. So, by parity of 
reasoning, the Bulls’ criterion “no same-sex couples and no unmarried opposite-sex 
couples” clearly constitutes direct discrimination because of sex. The addition of a 
new criterion does not in any way nullify an existing criterion. Compare also the 
pronouncement of the Court of Appeal (Owen and Briggs v James [1982]: 623E) 
that discriminatory conduct does not have to be animated solely by the discrimina-
tory ground.
Finally, it should be noted that even if intersectional discrimination is not cov-
ered by the Equality Act 2010 that does not tell against the argument that I have 
been deploying. Intersectional discrimination occurs when someone is discriminated 
against because they combine two protected characteristics. For example, it may be 
15 In the case of Black and Morgan v Wilkinson [2013] the reasoning is even clearer: Wilkinson “made it 
clear that she would not accommodate them because she did not like the idea of two men sharing a bed” 
(2495C [6]). See further discussion below.
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that A discriminates against black women but not against black men, and not against 
white women. It is disputed (cf. Hand 2011) whether in this case there would be 
no discrimination because of sex and no discrimination because of race, but in the 
case of the Bulls all men are discriminated against when it comes to the position of 
room-sharer with Preddy. It is not the intersection of the characteristic of being a 
man with another characteristic that rules out Hall from sharing a room with Preddy. 
Rather, being a man suffices all by itself to rule Hall out for that position.
The European Court of Justice
The argument deployed here that most cases commonly thought to be direct dis-
crimination because of sexual orientation are actually cases of direct discrimina-
tion because of sex was discussed in the European case Grant v South-West Trains 
[1998]. In this case Lisa Grant complained that South-West Trains had discrimi-
nated based on sex contrary to Article 119 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community in offering travel concessions to her predecessor’s, opposite-sex, partner 
but refusing them to her own, same-sex, partner (Grant v South-West Trains [1998]: 
1007 [7]–[10], 1009 [16]). Here the Court of Justice stated in its judgment:
[The argument that “sex” includes sexual orientation], which does not in any 
event appear to reflect the interpretation so far generally accepted of the con-
cept of discrimination based on sex which appears in various international 
instruments concerning the protection of fundamental rights, cannot in any 
case constitute a basis for the Court to extend the scope of Article 119 of the 
Treaty. That being so, the scope of that article, as of any provision of Commu-
nity law, is to be determined only by having regard to its wording and purpose, 
its place in the scheme of the Treaty and its legal context. It follows from the 
considerations set out above that Community law as it stands at present does 
not cover discrimination based on sexual orientation[.] (Grant v South-West 
Trains [1998]: 1013 [47])
This precedent, which, in any case, is concerned solely with Article 119, concern-
ing equality of pay, of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, is predomi-
nantly addressed to a different argument from the one that I am putting forward. The 
argument that the CJEU here rejects is a linguistic one, that the word “sex” should 
be construed so as to include sexual orientation (Grant v South-West Trains [1998]: 
1013 [43]). My argument is, by contrast, that, on a proper analysis, there is no need 
at all to invoke the concept of sexual orientation in establishing direct discrimination 
because of sex. (Compare the example given in his opinion by Advocate General 
Elmer: “[t]he provision must therefore also be regarded as precluding an employer 
from, for instance, denying a household allowance to an employee for sons under 18 
living at home when such an allowance in otherwise equivalent circumstances was 
given for daughters living at home” (Grant v South-West Trains [1998]: 999 [16]; 
cf. also 1000–1001, [21] and [22]). This makes it clear that sexual orientation does 




applied regardless of the sex of the worker concerned. Thus travel concessions 
are refused to a male worker if he is living with a person of the same sex, just 
as they are to a female worker if she is living with a person of the same sex. 
(Grant v South-West Trains [1998: 1001 [27]])
But this is just another example of the “hits both sexes equally hard” fallacy dis-
cussed above—the reason why the person is being turned away is because he or she 
is accompanied by someone of the same sex, rather than someone of the opposite 
sex. So, the Court of Justice’s argument in this paragraph is also unpersuasive.
There are several cases where the Court of Justice has found direct discrimination 
on grounds of sexual orientation that would have been better judged as examples 
of direct discrimination on grounds of sex.16 One such is the case previously men-
tioned as cited by Lady Hale as precedent for deciding Bull and Bull v Hall and 
Preddy [2013], viz. Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der Deutschen Bühnen [2008]. 
Here Tadao Maruko complained to the court that he had been denied a widower’s 
pension on the death of his life partner, who had been a member of the German 
Theatre Pension Institution. The Court of Justice held that:
If the referring court decides that surviving spouses and surviving life partners 
are in a comparable situation so far as concerns that survivor’s benefit, legisla-
tion such as that at issue in the main proceedings must, as a consequence, be 
considered to constitute direct discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. 
(Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der Deutschen Bühnen [2008]: 955 [72])
The answer to the implicit question here had, in fact, already been given by the 
court three paragraphs earlier:
The referring court considers that, in view of the harmonisation between mar-
riage and life partnership […] a life partnership, while not identical to mar-
riage, places persons of the same sex in a situation comparable to that of 
spouses so far as concerns the survivor’s benefit at issue in the main proceed-
ings. (Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der Deutschen Bühnen [2008]: 955 [69])
I suggest that once again this is not so much a case of direct discrimination 
because of sexual orientation, since the law governing life partnerships made no 
mention of either sexual orientation or sexual practice (see the Gesetz Über die 
Eingetragene Lebenspartnerschaft quoted in part in Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt 
der Deutschen Bühnen [2008]: 945–946, [8]–[11], also on-line at https ://www.geset 
ze-im-inter net.de/lpart g/BJNR0 26610 001.html, accessed 7 December 2019), but of 
direct discrimination because of sex, since it was a requirement of a life partnership 
that the two parties be of the same sex.
16 The EU Directives and Charter use the phrase “on grounds of” rather than the Equality Act 2010’s 
“because of”, but there seems to be no difference in meaning. It should also be noted that the phrase is 
“on grounds of sex”, not “on grounds of the individual’s sex” (cf. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964 
in the United States), or anything similarly restricted (Directive 2006/54/EC (2006: art 2(1)(a)), and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000: art 21(1))).
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Similar comments apply to Römer v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg [2011]: Jür-
gen Römer was held to have been the victim of direct discrimination on the ground 
of sexual orientation when he was denied a request to have his pension increased 
to recognize his life partner, since he would have been granted such an increase 
had he been married to someone of the opposite sex, on the assumption that “under 
national law, that life partner is in a legal and factual situation comparable to that of 
a married person as regards that pension” (Römer v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg 
[2011]: 308 [52]).17 Again, direct discrimination on the ground of sex would seem 
to have been the correct judgment here.
Further Implications
Would this reasoning hold for other cases? Consider the similar case of Black and 
Morgan v Wilkinson [2013]. This case was listed for a joint hearing with Bull and 
Bull v Hall and Preddy [2013] at the Supreme Court, but was withdrawn by the 
appellant, Susanne Wilkinson, at the last minute. The case was very similar to Bull 
and Bull v Hall and Preddy [2013], except that Black and Morgan were not in a civil 
partnership. The fact that Hall and Preddy were in a civil partnership was taken as 
one of the bases of the finding by Lady Hale and Lords Kerr and Toulson that there 
was direct discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation (Bull and Bull v Hall 
and Preddy [2013]: 3759B [68]). Lord Kerr explicitly suggested that, had Hall and 
Preddy not been in a civil partnership, there would have been only indirect discrimi-
nation (Bull and Bull v Hall and Preddy [2013]: 3758B [62]). So, it seems certain 
that, had Black and Morgan v Wilkinson [2013] been heard at the Supreme Court, 
the court would have found that Wilkinson only indirectly discriminated against 
Black and Morgan.
Nevertheless, I want to argue, in the light of the foregoing considerations, that, 
had Black and Morgan v Wilkinson [2013] been heard under the Equality Act 2010, 
there would have been a well-founded case that Wilkinson directly discriminated 
against Black and Morgan because of sex. The reason is that the criterion because 
of which Wilkinson turned away Black and Morgan was very similar to that of the 
Bulls: “I have sought to restrict the sharing of the double rooms to heterosexual, 
preferably married couples” (Black and Morgan v Wilkinson [2013]: 2494E [3]). 
(Note that, as with the Bulls’ criterion, the word “heterosexual” is added, even 
though at that point same-sex marriages were not legally recognized in England and 
Wales.) This is the description of what happened when Black and Morgan turned 
up to occupy the double room that Black had booked by e-mail, without mentioning 
Morgan (Black and Morgan v Wilkinson [2012]: [3] and [22.6]):
On seeing that they were both men, the defendant said that there was a prob-
lem as they had booked a double room. She made it clear that she would not 
17 The assumption seems to be fulfilled (Römer v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg [2011]: 307 [45]).
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accommodate them because she did not like the idea of two men sharing a bed. 
(Black and Morgan v Wilkinson [2013]: 2495C [6])
The arguments above, rehearsed in connection with the Bulls, suffice to show that 
there was no direct discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation: Black and Mor-
gan would not have been allowed to share a double room even if just good friends, 
unmarried opposite-sex couples of heterosexual orientation were not allowed to 
share double rooms, and a man of homosexual orientation married to a woman of 
homosexual orientation would have been welcome to share a double room. It seems 
to me, though, that there would have been direct discrimination because of sex under 
the Equality Act 2010. If one looks again at the description of what happened, one 
can see that Wilkinson did not wait to find out whether Black and Morgan were in 
a civil partnership. Her reason is clear: “she did not like the idea of two men shar-
ing a bed” [2013]: 2495C [6]. It is absolutely clear that the motivating premiss, the 
ground, here makes reference to sex (“men”), and not to sexual orientation, civil 
partnership, or even to marriage. So, under the provisions of the Equality Act 2010, 
Wilkinson must be adjudged to have directly discriminated against Black and Mor-
gan because of sex.
Here is another case in which the analysis presented of direct discrimination 
because of sex is clearly more accurate than the analysis of direct discrimination 
because of sexual orientation. Suppose that B and C are both employed by A, and 
are both bisexual, but that B is a man and C is a woman. Each of them is attracted 
to a man, D, and this is known to A. A dismisses B on the grounds that he cannot 
stand the “unnaturalness” of B’s being attracted to a man. A doesn’t dismiss C, as 
he regards her attraction to D as “natural”. It seems to me that the right thing to say 
here is not that A has directly discriminated against B because of sexual orientation 
(since B and C have the same orientation, as “orientation” is defined in section 12(1) 
of the Equality Act 2010); rather, it is that A has directly discriminated against B 
because of sex (since each of B and C is attracted to D, but only B gets dismissed, 
and that because he is a man). The underlying point here is that “being attracted 
to men” is not a sexual orientation known to the Equality Act 2010, while “being 
homosexual”, “being heterosexual”, and “being bisexual” are.
Also, legislation invalidating or forbidding same-sex marriage itself will be a 
case of direct discrimination because of sex. It has always been the case in England 
and Wales, and, as far as I know, in every jurisdiction, that someone of homosexual 
orientation has had the same right to get married as someone of heterosexual orien-
tation, and to marry someone of the same or different orientation—as long, histori-
cally, as they were of the opposite sex. So, while a law invalidating same-sex mar-
riage is indirectly discriminatory against those of homosexual orientation, it does 
not directly discriminate against them because of sexual orientation. It does, how-
ever, directly discriminate against same-sex couples because of sex, since the invali-
dation of same-sex marriage, as the name suggests, features sex as the ground of the 
less favourable treatment (the invalidation of the attempted union with the person in 
question, which would have been valid had one of the parties been of the opposite 
sex). This was the judgment of the Supreme Court of Hawai’i in a 1993 case eventu-
ally disposed of by constitutional amendment:
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It is the state’s regulation of access to the status of married persons, on the 
basis of the applicants’ sex, that gives rise to the question whether the appli-
cant couples have been denied the equal protection of the laws. (Baehr v Lewin 
(1993): 564)
It should be clear that the reasoning outlined will also be applicable to many 
other cases in which there is an allegation of direct discrimination because of sexual 
orientation—many of these will turn out to be cases of direct discrimination because 
of sex instead. One might wonder, in fact, in the light of the arguments advanced, 
whether they will all turn out to be cases of direct discrimination because of sex 
instead—does my analysis rule out there being any case of direct discrimination 
because of sexual orientation? No: suppose that a hotel put up a sign saying “no 
people of bisexual orientation in any rooms”; this refusal would constitute direct 
discrimination because of sexual orientation.18 Would it also constitute direct dis-
crimination because of sex? Suppose that the hotel receives an e-mail from someone 
saying “I am bisexual, but I have never had a partner—may I, then, stay at your hotel 
in a single room?”, signed simply with “Kim”. In refusing Kim, the hotel would not 
be directly discriminating against Kim because of Kim’s being a woman attracted to 
women (as well as men) or because of Kim’s being a man attracted to men (as well 
as women), because the hotel would not know which was the case. Nor would the 
hotel be directly discriminating against Kim because of actual associations with any 
person or persons of the same or the opposite sex, since Kim has never had a part-
ner. Does this mean, then, that we have here a case of direct discrimination because 
of sexual orientation that is not also a case of direct discrimination because of sex?
It seems to me that this is still a case of direct discrimination because of sex, 
since the role of sex is crucial in the reasoning that leads to the refusal. Recall the 
words quoted from Advocate General Maduro above:
The discriminator relies on a suspect classification in order to act in a certain 
way. The classification is not a mere contingency but serves as an essential 
premise of his reasoning […] [R]eliance on those suspect grounds is seen by 
the Community legal order as an evil which must be eradicated. Therefore, the 
Directive prohibits the use of those classifications as grounds upon which […] 
reasoning may be based. In this way, […] the prohibition of direct discrimina-
tion […] operates as an exclusionary mechanism [.] (Coleman v Attridge Law 
[2008]: 785–786 [19])
It is clear that the classification of sex still features in the hotelier’s reasoning 
above: the word “bisexual” means “being attracted to people of either sex”, so, on 
the assumption that the hotelier knows what the word means,19 the concept of sex 
19 Perhaps if someone just randomly picked the word “bisexual” out of the dictionary without under-
standing it, and decided to discriminate on that basis, we’d have a case of discrimination because of sex-
ual orientation without discrimination because of sex. And perhaps if the discriminator did understand 
it, but discriminated on a different basis from the meaning of the word, e.g. the discriminator simply 
discriminated against any people that described themselves by something beginning with the letter “b”, 
18 Of course, this case is quite different from the real case of the Bulls.
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is a crucial element in the hotelier’s reasoning, since if it were the case that Kim 
were attracted to different eye colours, rather than different sexes, there would be no 
problem in the hotelier’s view. The reader might ask: but who is Kim’s comparator? 
The comparator would be someone otherwise like Kim but attracted only to people 
of one sex. The hotelier would have treated this person better than Kim, so direct 
discrimination because of sex, the sex of the people to whom Kim is attracted, is 
made out.
It might be objected that this defines “because of sex” too widely. But consider a 
parallel example: suppose that an employer said to an employee “you’re fired; I over-
heard you say that you would be happy to be friends with both blacks and whites; 
I am not prepared to employ someone that would be happy to mix up the races like 
that”. It seems to me clear that sacking someone because they would be happy to be 
friends with both blacks and whites would be direct discrimination because of race. 
Compare here the remarks of Lord Simon in Applin v Race Relations Board [1974]:
It is inadmissible to read section 1 (1) as if it read “on the ground of his col-
our.” Not only would this involve reading into the subsection a word which is 
not there; it would also mean that some conduct which is plainly within the 
“mischief” would escape—for example, discriminating against a white woman 
on the ground that she had married a coloured man. It would therefore, in my 
view, be discrimination if the Watsons had treated local authorities seeking 
boarding-out facilities for coloured children less favourably than they would 
treat local authorities who either had no coloured children in care or who prof-
fered none for boarding-out. (289H–290A)
Other cases taking a similar line are Zarczynska v Levy [1979], Showboat Enter-
tainment Centre v Owens [1984], and Weathersfield Ltd (t/a Van & Truck Rent-
als) v Sargent [1998]. Each of these cases features an employee losing or leaving 
their job in protest at being ordered to engage in direct discrimination because of 
race. In each case the court held that the employee had been directly discriminated 
against because of race, not the employee’s race, but the race of the third parties 
against whom the employee had been told to discriminate. The courts did not, how-
ever, require that there actually exist such third parties that had been discriminated 
against: the mere giving of the order by the employer was enough, whether or not 
it was carried out. This establishes that in cases of associational discrimination like 
this it suffices that there potentially be third parties with the protected characteristic, 
it is not necessary that there actually be third parties with it in addition to the princi-
pal victim of discrimination. In consequence, a bisexual person can be discriminated 
against because of sex for being potentially attracted to both sexes even if there are 
no actual persons to whom they are in fact attracted.
I should stress, however, that what has been argued above is that every case of 
direct discrimination because of sexual orientation is a case of direct discrimination 
Footnote 19 (continued)
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because of sex (provided that the discriminator understands the concept with which 
they are working). It has not been argued that every single case in which someone is 
treated less favourably and the concept of sex plays a role in the reasoning motivat-
ing the less-favourable treatment is a case of direct discrimination because of sex. 
Suppose, for example, that an employee is sacked because they do not treat the sexes 
equally. In this case the concept of sex plays a role in the reasoning: if the employer 
had no concept of sex then they would not be able to sack the employee because 
they did not treat the sexes equally. And the employee is subjected to treatment less 
favourable than a comparator that did treat the sexes equally would have received. 
But the employee would surely not have a case for direct discrimination because 
of sex under anti-discrimination law: Redfearn v Serco Ltd [2006]. At this point it 
may be asked quite what role the concept of sex does have to play for a finding 
of direct discrimination because of sex. A version of this question came before the 
UK Supreme Court in 2018, but Lady Hale commented “It would be unwise in the 
context of this particular case to attempt to define the closeness of the association 
which justifies such a finding” (Lee v Ashers Baking Co. [2018]: 433C [33]). I do 
not intend to rush in here if the then President of the UK Supreme Court considered 
it unwise in the context of her case.
Conclusion
Gorsuch J argued in his judgment in Bostock v Clayton County (2020) that if one 
discriminated because of sexual orientation one ipso facto discriminated because of 
sex. It has been argued that this applies to the Equality Act 2010 too (provided one 
understands the concept of orientation with which one is working): cases of direct 
discrimination because of sexual orientation are also cases of direct discrimination 
because of sex. It has been further argued that many cases, such as Bull and Bull 
v Hall and Preddy [2013], that have been held by the courts to be cases of direct 
discrimination because of sexual orientation, are not cases of direct discrimination 
because of sexual orientation, but only cases of direct discrimination because of sex. 
It may be urged that this does not matter because, on my analysis, direct discrimina-
tion is still made out.20 Nevertheless, it is both of interest to understand the proper 
foundations of a charge and also important that those against whom the law finds are 
not said to have done something that they have not in fact done.
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